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Introduction
The issue of the eciency of economic reforms is central in public policy agenda. Once a reform has been shown desirable by economic theory or empirical test, its implementation does not always reach the objectives. This question as been addressed by Acemoglu et al. (2008) who point out that setting an independent central bank is eective at ghting ination if there are enough constraints on the executive. In this paper, we are interested in the eect of changes in retirement incentives on senior activity rate. We will conclude that their eciency is conditioned by the quality of labor relations in the country.
Senior employment and activity rates are crucial economic issues, both for the sustainability of pension system, and for the raw creadtion of wealth. Facing the aging of their population, most developed countries have been constantly adjusting pension systems during the last decades. Any pension reform or adjustment has two objectives : rst, a change in retirement schemes aims to improve the balance between expenditure and resources of the pension system ; second, it also aims to modify senior activity rate. The latter objective can of course be a major factor that allow to achieve the former.
In this paper, we focus on the eect of changes in retirement incentives on senior activity rate.
We argue that the quality of working conditions in a country is likely to alter the response of senior activity rate to changes in retirement incentives. We rst present a highly stylized model where senior workers have the choice between work and retirement. Their choice is aected by their perception of the disutility of labor and by the generosity of the pension system. At the aggregate level, the response of senior labor force participation rate to a change in retirement incentives depends on the distribution of the disutility of labor in the society. Then, turning to empirical evidence, we use aggregate data and show that the disutility of labor, approximated by the quality of labor relations, fosters the elasticity of senior male participation rate with respect to the implicit tax on continued work, which is the cost of staying at work compared with retiring.
Instruments to increase senior employment rate can be the postponing of the standard retirement age or the decreasing of retirement incentives which involve pension and contribution rates changes.
The importance of this parameter has been stressed by . He showed that a decrease of the incentive to retirement may reduce the fall of employment between two ve-years age groups. In a dynamic approach, Blau and Goodstein (2010) The intuition behind the results presented in this paper is fairly simple : monetary incentives can play a role in the retirement decision only if workers suciently enjoy going to work. In the opposite case, any decrease in retirement incentives would not have any eect on the seniors' decision since they suer a large disutility at work. This idea that some factors may interfere with the retirement decision has been investigated by Blau and Shvydko (2007) who focused on the characteristics of rms and contracts. By an empirical study, they showed that seniors' choice of retirement also depends on the rigidities of technologies. Similarly, according to Cheron et al. (2004) , trying to increase senior employment by a change of pension scheme is useless if wages are rigid and above their walrasian level.
At the country level, our proxy for the disutility at work is the quality of labor relations both between workmates and between employers and employees. Such idea on the inuence of labor relations on macroeconomic outputs was studied by Blanchard and Phillipon (2004) . Considering the number of social conicts as a proxy for bad labor relations, they showed that bad relations strengthen the negative eect of asymmetric information on the job market. Understanding labor relations as a component of a country's cultural trait, this paper is also linked to the the literature on economic outcomes of culture. Interactions between labor markets outcomes and culture has been investigated by Aghion, Algan and Cahuc (2011). They show that policy can aect cooperation on the labor market depending on individual expectations regarding the organization of collective relations. The way culture and beliefs can aect activity rates has been underlined by Giavazzi, Schiantarelli and Seranelli (2010) . They show that culture matters for youth and female employment rates.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we document the evolutions of senior activity rates and retirement incentives between 1990 and 2000. In section 3, we present the model and derive its implications. We describe the data used in the macroeconomic empirical part and present corresponding results in section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes.
Evolutions of retirement incentives and senior activity rates
As stressed in the introduction, governments can play on two parameters in order to inuence senior activity rates : the standard retirement age, i.e. the standard age of eligibility to old-age pension benets, and the extent of monetary retirement incentives. In this section, we briey document the evolution of senior activity rates and retirement incentives between 1980 and 2000. Table 1 presents changes in the implicit taxes on continued work, the standard retirement age and senior activity rates over the periods 1980-1990 and 1990-2000 for 14 OECD countries. The implicit tax on continued work has been computed by . It takes into account expected pension wealth and both employers and employees rates of contribution to the pension system. 1 When the implicit tax on continued work increases, a worker has weaker incentives to continue working. Senior activity rates are from the OECD database.
Over the period surveyed in table 1, standard retirement ages have not change much. Only three countries experienced changes in that parameter. France decreased it of ve years between 1981 and 1983. Italy increased it progressively from 60 to 65 between 1994 and 2000. The government of New Zealand conducted the same reform between the late 1980s and the year 2000.
On the contrary, changes in the implicit taxes on continued work are far more frequent. We clearly see that nor the populations treated (age group 55-59 or age group 60-64), nor reactions to these are homogeneous. Over the period 1980-1990, implicit tax on continued work for age group 55-59 and the activity rate of this age group have moved in opposite directions in countries like Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United States. In other countries, both variables exhibited changes in the same direction. Similar remarks easily apply to age group 60-64 or to the 1990-2000 period. It is clear that the reaction of senior activity rate to changes in incentives is far from homogeneous.
Focusing on Finland and Italy can give us an idea of these striking dierences. Figure 1 presents the evolutions of senior activity rate and implicit tax on continued work for age group 60-64 for these countries. In the case of Finland, we notice a perfect symmetric movement of incentives to retire and senior activity rate. The standard retirement age in Finland did not change over this period, remaining See section 4 below for a detailed description of the implicit tax on continued work. 
Model
In this section, we present a very simple model that can partly explain the dierences mentioned above.
The objective of this model is not to represent the whole process of the retirement decision. This would involve taking into account that individuals may optimize over longer time horizons, or modeling the retirement decision using an option value approach. On the contrary, the model is highly stylized, and aims at capturing a partial mechanism at the individual level and its aggregate consequences.
All senior individuals face a trade-o between work and retirement. This model shows how their choice depends on the disutility of labor and how the distribution of that later parameter alters the link between retirement incentives and labor force participation rate at the macroeconomic level. 
As a consequence, individual i chooses to retire early if and only if
This result only implies that a worker stops to work in the rst period if her disutility of labor exceeds the net gain of work during one more period. It is straightforward to see that individual i will have less incentives to retire if the right-hand term increases, i.e. if the gain of work during one more period becomes larger than the disutility of labor. This result is not path-breaking and simply mirrors the basic mechanisms of all retirement decision models. However, it will allow us to underline how the aggregate eect of changes in retirement incentives on senior activity rate depends on the distribution of the disutility of labor.
Aggregate consequences
The set of seniors choosing to stay at work in the rst period is :
Assume that in a given country c disutility of labor is distributed among seniors according to the cumulative distribution function F c (.). Then, the proportion of seniors working in country c is simply given by
Since F c (.) is an increasing function, the fraction of seniors in the labor force is obviously increasing with the wage w and decreasing with the penalty on pension α. We can derive additional properties from this simple model :
1. For a given set of the parameters α, p and w, the resulting labor force participation rate in country c depends on the distribution of the disutility of labor F c (.).
Let us write
Since F c (.) ≥ 0, we get ∂n c /∂T ≥ 0. This implies that the stronger the incentive to stay at work, the larger the proportion of seniors who continue working. Individuals responds to incentives unless the density of variable δ is null. However, the size of the eect of a change in T on n c depends on the characteristics of the distribution function F c (.).
As a result, the eectiveness of early retirement incentives depends on the characteristics of the distribution function of the disutility of labor among workers.
Empirical evidence
In this section, we test the two properties of our model using international aggregate data. Parameter T , the incentive to stay at work, is identied using the implicit tax on continued work (see below). We rst present the data, then we present empirical results using international panel data. The models to be estimated will be presented on the y.
Data
This sub-section describes the data used in this paper. We use data from several sources. Our sample includes 19 OECD countries : Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan South Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.
Senior activity rates Senior activity rates are taken from the OECD database. Data are available for males and females by age group from the mid-1980s onwards. We built two measures and selected data for males in age groups 55-59 and 60-64. We focus on senior male individuals for a very simple reason : data on retirement incentives are available only for male workers. However, this restriction oers the advantage to avoid all issues related to female employment, which are obviously beyond the scope of this paper.
Pension system
Pension system generosity is measured using the implicit tax on continued work developed by . The average implicit tax on continued work is computed for each year at a given age for a ve year period. It takes into account expected pension wealth and both employers and employees rates of contribution to the pension system. In other terms, when the implicit tax on continued work increases, a worker has weaker incentives to continue working.
Let us recall the formula used by . Formally, the implicit tax on continued work in a specic year is the change in pension or social wealth from working ve additional years (from R or R + 5) :
where P W Y k is the present value of expected pension payments at age k, S k is the probability of being alive at age k, r is the real discount rate, and, nally, C A /Y is the sum of employees and employers rates of contributions to the pension system. For a more detailed presentation of the methodology, see Duval (2003) . In this paper, we use the measures for the 55-59 and 60-64 age groups. For each age group, the implicit tax is available with or without taking into account early retirement schemes. However, implicit tax including early retirement route is by construction less trustworthy since information about early retirement eligibility are hard to assemble. This is why we focus on the indicator without early retirement schemes. Table. We take the OECD male unemployment rate as a proxy for economic activity at the country level. We also use the standard retirement age provided by Duval (2003).
Results
This sub-section presents empirical evidence. We rst show that working conditions explain some of cross country dierences in senior activity rates. Then, we use panel data estimates to show that senior activity rate does react stronger to changes in incentives in countries with better and more homogeneously distributed labor relations. By doing this, we extend and mitigate the analysis of the eect of retirement incentives on the retirement decision using international data, as conducted by
Blöndal and Scarpetta (1999), Johnson (2000) and among others.
Cross country evidence
We pooled all available observations in order to investigate the cross-country relationship between working conditions and senior activity rates. In column 1, we merely regress senior males activity rate on average relation between management and employees. The estimated coecient is positive and signicant at the 10% level. In column 2, we include a dummy variable for European countries to ensure that this relationship is not driven only by the opposition between Europe and the rest of the world. Indeed, Alesina et al. (2001) pointed out the specicity of the European welfare states that could explain part of the dierences in senior activity rates. The estimated coecient on rel management increases and becomes signicant at the 5% level.
The dummy variable for European countries is negative and signicant. This implies that senior labor force participation rates are weaker in Europe than in the rest of the world. In column 3, we control by the implicit tax on continued work for age group 55-59 : this variable is not signicant whereas the quality of the relations between management and employees remains signicant at the 5% level and has the same order of magnitude as in former specications. In column 4, we add real GDP per capita and standard retirement age as additional control variable, which lowers the signicance of the coecient on rel management. In columns 5 to 8 we repeat the same exercise with the other measure of working conditions. The eect of rel workmates is robust to the introduction of all co-variates. Observations 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 R-squared 0,154 0,345 0,445 0,486 0,123 0,403 0,463 0,501 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in parentheses OLS regressions with time xed eects Implicit tax is dened for reported age group As shown in the bottom part of the table, the results are very similar when using data for age group 60-64. When signicant, the coecient of the implicit tax variable is negative. This result is consistent with our prediction that controlling for working conditions, generosity of the pension system has a negative impact on senior activity rate. These results show that, in a cross section of countries, better working conditions, represented by labor relations, are associated with stronger labor force participation rate of senior males, which is consistent with our model.
Panel data evidence
In this sub-section, we test the following conclusion of the model : at the aggregate level, the eect of a change in retirement incentives on senior activity rate depends on the characteristics of the distribution function of working conditions. From now on, senior activity rates and implicit taxes are always taken in log. Thus, estimated coecients reect elasticities of labor market participation to retirement incentives.
Benchmark estimations
We rst estimate the average eect of the implicit taxes on senior activity rate. 
Implicit tax -0,00338 0,00167 -0,0116 -0.0698** -0.0668** -0,0312 (0,0132) (0,0146) (0,0118) (0,033) (0,0293) (0,0261) Unemployment rate -0.00586*** 0,000862 -0,000252 -0.0229*** -0.0137*** -0.0125*** (0,00126) (0,00175) (0,00174) (0,00305) (0,00454) (0,00421) Real GDP per capita -0.105*** 0.112* 0,0326 -0.279*** 0,0641 0,165 (0,0214) (0,0665) (0,0632) (0,0566) (0 It is clear that wealth, measured as the real GDP per capita, and economic activity, measured as male unemployment rate, both have negative eects on the labor force participation rate of seniors.
The eect of wealth on the dependent variable suggests that non-participation to the labor market increases as the economy grows. However, when including time xed eect in order to control for the evolution of senior activity rate common to all countries, the eect of real GDP per capita vanishes.
This suggests that labor force participation rate of seniors depends more on broad global economic developments than on specic national wealth eects.
Interaction between implicit tax and average working conditions
We now allow the eect of implicit tax on continued work to vary with the distribution of working conditions. Hence, the estimated equation is now :
where n it denotes labor force participation rate of senior males in country i at time t, T it the implicit tax on continued work, W i working conditions and X it a vector of control variables (wealth, unemployment and standard retirement age). The variable C i is the country xed eect, δ 4 the constant, and e it the error term. More complete specications include year xed eects Y t not reported in equation (1) . Since country xed eects are included and given the structure of available data for working conditions (see above), variable W i does not vary across time within country and its coecient will not be reported.
group are missing for France. However, data on implicit tax including early retirement route are available. Results of estimations using these data and including France are presented in appendix and conrm the results presented here.
The estimated elasticity may now vary with working conditions : In columns 10 to 12, the interaction variable is the quality of relations between management and employees. In this case, the interaction term is not signicant. However, it is signicant and negative in the left part of the table, i.e. when the quality of relation between workmates is used as interaction variable. In the most demanding specication, the estimated eect ranges from −0.01 to −0, 07.
These results imply rst that labor participation rate of senior reacts stronger to changes in retirement incentives in countries with better average working conditions ; but also that the situation is dierent for dierent age groups. In the case of young seniors, i.e. for age group 55-59, both the quality of the relation with employers and between workmates matters. However the eect of retirement incentives on the retirement decision is weak. On the contrary, for old seniors, i.e. for age group 60-64, only the quality of the relations between workmates plays a role. This shows a strong conditional eect of retirement incentives.
Interaction between implicit tax and the dispersion of working conditions
We will now use the coecient of variation of working conditions at the country level as an alternative characteristic of the distribution of the quality of labor relations. Table 5 presents the estimated coecients of equation (1) .
For age group 55-59, the interaction term between implicit tax and the coecient of variation is positive and signicant in all specications. The coecient is positive, which suggests that countries with more a more homogeneous distribution of working conditions, i.e. a weaker coecient of variation, react stronger to changes in incentives than countries with higher dispersion of working conditions.
In the two bottom lines, the reading order is opposite to the one in former tables. The maximum (minimum) eect is the elasticity associated with the country with the higher (lower) dispersion of working conditions. Whereas some specication leads to a puzzling positive maximum eect, the most demanding specications (columns 3 and 6) furnish a reassuring null maximum eect. Thus, the estimated eect ranges from 0 to −0.02 or −0.03. These estimations are very similar to the former.
Results for age group 60-64 are presented in the bottom part of table 5. They mirror those found in table 4. Indeed, we nd no eect of the interaction with the dispersion of the relations with employers.
On the contrary, relation with workmates play once again a role in the reaction of activity rate to changes in retirement in the implicit tax on continued work.
Intuitively, this may be explained by the fact that in a country where people are similar in their disutility to work, more people will react to small changes (unless we are situated in the queue of the distribution). 
Implicit tax 0.263*** 0.221*** 0.147** 0.218*** 0.202*** 0.135** (0,0719) (0,077) (0,0655) (0,0716) (0,0765) (0,0652) Interaction term -0.0649*** -0.0537*** -0.0384** -0.0589*** -0.0534*** -0.0387** (0,0166) (0,0176) (0,0151) (0,0177) (0,0187) (0,0161) Unemployment rate -0.00553*** 0,000858 -0,000136 -0.00601*** 0,000326 -0,000523 (0,0012) (0,00166) (0,00169) (0,00125) (0,00169) (0,00171) Real GDP per capita -0.107*** 0,0917 0,0266 -0.108*** 0,0866 0,0226 (0,0203) (0,0566) (0,0571) (0,0208) (0,0587) (0,0589) Standard retirement age -0.0201** -0.0201** (0,00801) (0,00797) 
Implicit tax 0.234* 0,135 0.288** -0,0557 -0,142 0,042 (0,123) (0,132) (0,136) (0,133) (0,14) (0,128) Interaction term -0.0744** -0,0496 -0.0776** -0,00378 0,0202 -0,0194 (0,0313) (0,0326) (0,0322) (0,036) (0,0373) (0,0332) Unemployment rate -0.0222*** -0.0133*** -0.0118*** -0.0229*** -0.0136*** -0.0125*** (0,00295) (0,00451) (0,00417) (0,00305) (0,00456) (0,00421) Real GDP per capita -0.277*** 0,0543 0,157 -0.279*** 0,0657 0,167 (0,0554) (0,149) (0,139) (0,057) (0,156) (0,148) Standard retirement age 0.0534*** 0.0512*** (0,0187) (0,0191) Constant 6.923*** 3.615** -0,928 6.941*** 3.495** -0,881 (0,562) ( These results suggest that labor participation rate of seniors react stronger to changes in retirement incentives in countries with more homogeneously distributed labor relations.
Conclusion
In this paper, we tried to identied one of the causes of dierent reactions of the senior populations to monetary incentives between countries. By a simple model we rst showed that one of the determinants of how seniors react to policies is their disutility at work. We tested this hypothesis by using aggregate panel data.
We then used aggregate panel data and average opinions about working conditions from the ISSP in 19 OECD countries to investigate the interplay between working conditions and retirement incentives at the aggregate level. We found that if the average opinion about labor relations is high in a country, then senior employment will be more sensitive to changes in retirement incentives. We have also shown that reactions to policies are stronger when opinions are homogeneous.
A side result of this paper is that all type of labor relations do not play the same role in the retirement decision. Namely, we found that the quality of labor relations between colleagues interfere with retirement incentives for all seniors, whereas the quality of relations between management and employees only plays a role for young seniors. This leaves room for future researches on the subjective determinants of the retirement decision.
This paper stressed the key role of the quality of work conditions in the trade-o between work and retirement. Our results imply that changes in retirement incentives are a necessary condition to foster senior activity rate, but surely not a sucient condition. A policy that would only focus on nancial incentives would miss one of its goal and would not have any eect on seniors' activity if the latter suer from a large disutility of labor. 
Implicit tax -0.0477*** -0.0404** -0.0399*** -0.0484*** -0.0526*** -0.0510*** (0,0157) (0,0155) (0,0129) (0,0183) (0,0162) (0,0136) Interaction term 0.309*** 0.291*** 0.218*** 0.198*** 0.241*** 0.189*** (0,0795) (0,0791) (0,0622) (0,0659) (0,0584) (0,0463) Unemployment rate -0.00486*** 0,00203 0,000877 -0.00547*** 0,00217 0,00104 (0,00113) (0,00159) (0,00165) (0,00116) (0,00157) (0,00164) Real GDP per capita -0.0972*** 0.132** 0,0662 -0.0979*** 0.153** 0,0832 (0,0196) (0,0588) (0,0591) (0,0203) (0,0605) (0,0608) Standard retirement age -0.0173** -0.0172** (0,00775) (0,00771) 
Implicit tax -0.0919** -0.0819** -0.0664** -0,0294 -0,0247 -0,0261 (0,0418) (0,0364) (0,0303) (0,0464) (0,0439) (0,0393) Interaction term 0,159 0,109 0.288* -0,159 -0,167 -0,0229 (0,118) (0,126) (0,146) (0,116) (0,127) (0,114) Unemployment rate -0.0221*** -0.0128*** -0.0101** -0.0231*** -0.0148*** -0.0127*** (0,00299) (0,00457) (0,00429) (0,00311) (0,00476) (0,0044) Real GDP per capita -0.269*** 0,0791 0,219 -0.290*** 0,0142 0,156 (0,0573) (0,154) (0,148) (0,0593) (0,157) (0,149) Standard retirement age 0.0565*** 0.0488*** (0,0189) (0,0187) Constant 6.845*** 3.365** -1,752 7.042*** 3.989** -0,624 (0,576) ( 
Implicit tax -0.0536*** -0.0460*** -0.0429*** -0.0547*** -0.0512*** -0.0482*** (0 
